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The Westinghouse AP1000 is a new design nuclear power plant which has 
implemented the concept of passive system. Even though a passive system may be 
more reliable than an active one, the possibility of the passive system to fail still 
exists. In line with this possibility, generic database have been used to study the 
reliability of the AP1000 passive safety system. However, since the used data are 
not specific to the AP1000, the results of the analysis will not show its real 
performance. This study proposes a fuzzy reliability approach to overcome this 
problem. The proposed fuzzy reliability approach utilizes the concept of failure 
possibility to qualitatively describe basic event likely occurences and membership 
functions of triangular fuzzy numbers to quantitatively represent qualitative failure 
possibilities. A case-based experiment on reliability study of the AP1000 passive 
safety system involved to mitigate a large break loss of collant accident is used to 
validate the feasibility of the proposed approach. By comparisons, probabilities of 
basic events generated by the proposed approach are very close to the ones which 
have been used by previous reliability studies. This can be observed from the small 
numbers of relative errors, i.e. between 0.004125 and 0.079635. These results 
confirm that the fuzzy reliability approach offers a more realistic technique to study 
the reliability of the AP1000 passive safety system, without the need to engage to 
precise probability distributions of its components which are currently unavailable. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The performance of the safety systems of 
nuclear power plants, which ensures that the plants 
can normally operate without an excessive risk 
exposure to staffs and environment, prevents 
accidents and mitigates the consequences of 
accidents if they occur, is a very important factor to 
enhance nuclear energy options. In line with this, the 
concepts of passive systems have been the focus of 
recent innovations to the designs of nuclear power 
plant safety systems. The Westinghouse AP1000 is a 
two-loop advanced light water reactor which 
implements passive concept to its safety systems 
based on gravity, convection, condensation and heat 
circulation [1-5]. AP1000 has been certified as a 
generation III+ reactor by the United States Nuclear 
Energy  Commission (US-NRC) and the European 
Utility Requirements [6,7]. AP1000 design offers 
four advantageous, i.e. high reliability, human               
error minimization, simplification and easy 
modularization [8]. It is the first commercial nuclear 
                                                 
 
 Corresponding author. 
   E-mail address: purba-jh@batan.go.id 
power plant design whose all safety features depend 
on passive systems [9] and is currently under 
construction in China [4,10,11]. Even though, a 
passive system may be more reliable than an active 
system [5], the possibility of the passive system to 
fail still exists due to the failures of the passive 
system itself to response to the physical 
phenomenon in which it is based on. Therefore, the 
reliability of AP1000 passive safety system still 
needs to be studied by considering many possible 
different accident scenarios. 
 Meanwhile, fault tree analysis has been 
widely used to evaluate the reliability of the safety 
systems of nuclear power plants. It provides a 
comprehensive and structured approach to identify 
and understand key plant vulnerabilities, to develop 
accident scenarios, to assess the level of plant safety, 
and to derive numerical estimates of potential risks 
[12,13]. To perform this analysis, safety analysts 
have to provide reliability data of all basic events of 
the system fault tree being evaluated. 
 Since AP1000 is still under construction, 
safety analysts have to use generic database to study 
the reliability of its passive safety system.                       
For example, generic database has been used in 
Atom Indonesia 
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Kamyab et al. [14] and in Kamyab and Nematollahi 
[15] to evaluate to what extend the passive core 
cooling system can affect the final core damage 
frequency of AP1000. Meanwhile, Guimaraes et al. 
[16] used generic database to study the reliability of 
the AP1000 passive safety system to mitigate large 
break loss of coolant accident (LOCA). In addition, 
Zhou et al. [17] used generic database to evaluate 
the reliability of the AP1000 passive residual heat 
removal system. Those generic databases may be 
taken from other nuclear power plants or nuclear 
industries other than nuclear power plants. 
 However, since component reliability data 
used in those previous AP1000 reliability study are 
not taken from the AP1000 operating experiences, 
the results of the analysis do not actually show the 
real performance of its passive safety system. 
Moreover, safety analysts have to deal with 
imprecision and uncertainties arising from the 
generic database. To deal with these drawbacks, a 
new approach should be proposed and applied to 
evaluate reliability characteristic of components of 
the AP1000 passive safety system without the need 
to engage to historical failure data which are 
currently unavailable. 
In the meantime, fuzzy reliability approach 
has been developed and successfully applied for 
reliability study of existing nuclear power plants             
[18-20]. It utilizes the concept of failure possibilities 
to qualitatively describe component failure 
characteristics and membership functions of 
triangular fuzzy numbers to represent qualitative 
failure possibilities in mathematical form. Hence, the 
motivation of this study is to propose and implement 
the fuzzy reliability approach to evaluate the 
reliability of components of the AP1000 passive 
safety system. A case-based experiment on the 
reliability study of the AP1000 passive system 
involved to mitigate a large break LOCA is then 
used to mathematically illustrate the feasibility of 
the proposed approach. 
 
 
AP1000 passive safety system to mitigate a 
large break loca 
 
Loss of coolant accident (LOCA) is one of 
many postulated accidents that might occur in 
nuclear power plants. LOCA is defined as an 
accident in which reactor coolant pressure boundary 
breaks to freely discharge reactor coolant. LOCA 
which is caused by a large break in the primary 
coolant system is a design basis accident for 
pressurized water reactors [21]. 
The primary coolant system of the AP1000 
whose function to circulate coolant between the 
reactor core and the steam generators involves two 
loops of heat transfer systems and one pressurizer. 
Each loop consists of one steam generator, two 
reactor coolant pumps, one hot leg, and two cold 
legs as shown in Fig. 1 [7]. 
 
 
Fig. 1. AP1000 reactor coolant system. 
 
AP1000, which is designed based on the 
Westinghouse proven pressurized water reactors   
[22,23], has implemented the concept of passive 
system into its safety injection system, residual heat 
removal system and containment cooling system.  
The major advantage of these passive safety systems 
is that the long-term accident mitigation can be 
maintained without the involvement of the operators 
and reliance on the AC power sources from offsite 
or onsite [3,9]. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. AP1000 passive safety system to mitigate a large              
break LOCA. 
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AP1000 reactors provide three passive safety 
systems to mitigate the large break LOCA, namely: 
injection system by accumulator (AI), low pressure 
injection system (LPI) which injects water from                
in-containment refueling water storage tank 
(IRWST) and long term cooling system (LTC) 
which injects water from passive containment 
cooling water storage tank (PCCWST) [16]. Figure 2 
shows the simplified schema of the working process 
of those three safety systems. 
 A number of valves are aligned to 
automatically actuate those three passive safety 
systems by shifting the valve positions. To provide 
high reliability, those valves are automatically 
actuated to their safeguard positions when they loss 
of power or receive actuation signal [23].                       
The description of the passive injection system by 
accumulator, passive low pressure injection system 
and passive long term cooling system and their 
corresponding fault trees as well as the probabilities 
of basic events used to study the reliability of the 
AP1000 passive safety system can be read in details 
in Guimaraes et al. [16]. Table 1 shows the 
probabilities of basic events of the three safety 
systems in Fig. 2 which function to mitigate the 
AP1000 large break LOCA. By assuming that those 
reliability data are relevant for studying the 
reliability of the AP1000 passive safety system, we 
then use those data to benchmark our proposed 
approach. To confirm the feasibility of the fuzzy                    
reliability approach, it has to generate probabilities 
of basic events as closes as possible to the ones 
given in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Probabilities of basic events involved to mitigate the 
AP1000 large break LOCA. 
 
Basic event IDs Component Failures Probabilities 
b1 The failure of V1  7.59E-6 
b2 The failure of V2  1.11E-5 
b3 The failure of V3  1.11E-5 
b4 The failure of V4  7.59E-6 
b5 The failure of V5  1.11E-5 
b6 The failure of V6  1.11E-5 
b7 The failure of V7  1.90E-4 
b8 The failure of V8  1.90E-4 
b9 The failure of V9  1.06E-4 
b10 The failure of V10  1.90E-4 
b11 The failure of V11  1.11E-5 
b12 The failure of V12  1.90E-4 
b13 The failure of AOV 1.21E-4 
b14 The failure of MOV 7.59E-6 
EXPERIMENTAL METHODS 
 
Methodology 
 
Fuzzy reliability approach is used in this study 
to generate the probabilities of those basic events in 
Table 1. It applies seven terms of failure possibilities 
to qualitatively describe basic event likely 
occurences and seven membership functions of 
triangular fuzzy numbers to represent those 
qualitative reliability characteristics in mathematical 
form as shown in Table 2 [18]. 
 
Table 2. Qualitative failure possibilities and the corresponding 
failure likelihood values and membership functions. 
 
Failure 
possibilities 
Failure 
likelihood 
values 
Membership functions 
Very Low (h1) < 1.0E-8 
  ( )           ( )
 (              ) 
Low (h2) 1.0E-8–1.0E-7 
  ( )      ( )
 (              ) 
Reasonably 
Low (h3) 
1.0E-7–1.0E-6 
  ( )                 ( )
 (              ) 
Moderate (h4) 1.0E-6–1.0E-5 
  ( )           ( )
 (              ) 
Reasonably 
High (h5) 
1.0E-5–1.0E-4 
  ( )                 ( )
 (              ) 
High (h6) 1.0E-4–1.0E-3 
  ( )       ( )
 (              ) 
Very High (h7) > 1.0E-3 
  ( )           ( )
 (              ) 
 
The quantification process of the fuzzy 
reliability approach to generate probabilities of basic 
events of fault trees consists of five steps which can 
be described as follows. 
Step 1: Basic event likely occurrence evaluation 
The objective of this step is to generate a 
matrix of failure possibilities (Ql) to express the 
likely occurrences of a set of basic events (B) of a 
system fault tree (FT) being evaluated. These failure 
possibilities are subjectively and individually 
assessed by a set of experts (E) based on their 
expertise, working experiences and scientific 
intuition. An expert is a person who is familiar with 
the system being evaluated, understands its working 
environment, and has considerable training in and 
knowledge of its operation.  
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  {         }  and                   (2) 
  {        }                                            (3) 
51 
J.H. Purba, D.T. Sony Tjahyani / Atom Indonesia Vol. 40 No. 2 (2014) 49 - 56 
 
 
where   
    
 is the i
th
 failure possibility in Table 2 to 
express the likely occurrence of basic event bk in (2) 
which is evaluated by expert ej in (3), l is the number 
of basic events and n is the number of experts. For 
example, if the likely occurence of basic event b2 is 
evaluated by expert e3 to be Very Low and from 
Table 2 we can see that Very Low is defined as the 
first failure possibility, therefore   
       
    . 
Basic event likely occurences could be 
collected from the set of experts by asking questions 
assuming the form:  
 
 What is the likely occurence of basic event bi? 
 Is it “Very Low”, “Low”, “Reasonably Low”, 
“Moderate”, “Reasonably High”, “High”, or “Very 
High”? 
 
 To correlate experts’ credibility to their 
judgments, different justification weights from 0 to 1 
may be assigned to each expert as in (4). 
 
   {                  ∑   
 
     }      (4) 
 
where wi is the weight of the i
th
 expert. An expert 
with a weight of 1 is the most credible, whilst an 
expert with a lower weight is deemed to be less 
credible. 
Step 2: Failure possibility fuzzification 
The objective of this step is to generate a 
matrix of membership functions (Qn) of the failure 
possibility matrix (Ql) generated in Step 1.                     
The matrix Qn in (5) consists of only membership 
functions of triangular fuzzy numbers taken from 
Table 2. 
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where   
    ( ) is the corresponding membership 
functions for the   
    
. For example, if the   
     
  
     then   
    ( )    
    ( )           ( ) = 
(0.00, 0.04, 0.08). 
Step 3: Final membership function generation 
The objective of this step is to generate a set 
of final membership functions (M
B
) for the set B 
defined in (2) by multiplying the membership 
function matrix (Qn) generated in Step 2 with the 
corresponding experts’ weight defined in (4) as 
shown in (6).  
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                  (6) 
where    ( ) is the final membership function for 
the i
th
 basic event and wi is the weight of the i
th
 
expert.  
Step 4: Membership function defuzzification 
The objective of this step is to generate a set 
of failure possibility scores (  
 ) of the set of final 
membership functions (M
B
) generated in Step 3.                
A failure possibility score represents the experts’ 
belief of the most likely score to indicate that an 
event may occur. It is decoded from a final 
membership function using an area defuzzification 
technique (ADT) as in (7). 
 
   
  
[
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
    ( 
  ( ))
   (   ( ))
   (   ( ))
 
   (   ( ))]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               (7) 
  
    is a failure possibility score for the ith basic 
event which is defuzzified from its final membership 
function (   ( )).  
 The ADT for the membership functions of 
triangular fuzzy numbers  ( )  (     ) can be 
calculated using (8) [24]. 
 
    ( ( ))  
 
  
(      )                  (8) 
Step 5 : Basic event probability generation 
The objective of this step is to generate a set 
of probabilities (R
B
) from the set of failure 
possibility scores (  
 ) generated in Step 4 as 
shown in (9).  
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where  (  
  ) is a logarithmic function as shown in 
(10) [18]. 
52 
J.H. Purba, D.T. Sony Tjahyani / Atom Indonesia Vol. 40 No. 2 (2014) 49 - 56 
 
 (  
  )  
{
 
 
 
 
 
  
[
    
  
  
  
]
 
 ⁄
       
if   
     
 if   
     
        (10) 
 
Mathematical illustration 
 We can see from Table 1 that there are 14 
basic events whose probabilities to be evaluated by 
the fuzzy reliability approach described in the 
previous sub-section as denoted in (11). 
 
  {                                              }   (11) 
 
 Let us assume that seven experts have been 
selected to evaluate the probabilities of those basic 
events in (11) as denoted in (12). To simplify the 
quantification process, let us also assume  that those 
seven experts have the same level of expertise and 
hence the same justification weights of 1/7s are 
assigned to each expert as denoted in (13). 
 
  {                    }                                (12) 
  {                        
 
 
}             (13) 
 
 In real implementation, these experts should 
be properly selected and weighted. Experts may be 
selected by considering their publications and 
working experiences related to the AP1000 passive 
safety system. Recommendations from a wide range 
of experts can be another important point for the 
expert selection [18,19]. 
 Using the format of questions described in the 
previous sub-section, each expert in (12) 
subjectively and individually evaluates the likely 
occurrences of those basic events in Table 1 and the 
experts’ justification results are given in Table 3. 
Table 3. Likely occurences of basic events in Table 1 evaluated 
by experts. 
 
Basic event IDs 
Basic event likely occurences evaluated by 
e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 e7 
b1 h4 h3 h3 h3 h3 h3 h3 
b2 h4 h2 h3 h4 h3 h4 h2 
b3 h4 h2 h3 h4 h3 h4 h2 
b4 h4 h3 h3 h3 h3 h3 h3 
b5 h4 h2 h3 h4 h3 h4 h2 
b6 h4 h2 h3 h4 h3 h4 h2 
b7 h5 h4 h5 h4 h5 h4 h5 
b8 h5 h4 h5 h4 h5 h4 h5 
b9 h4 h5 h4 h4 h4 h5 h4 
b10 h5 h4 h5 h4 h5 h4 h5 
b11 h4 h2 h3 h4 h3 h4 h2 
b12 h5 h4 h5 h4 h5 h4 h5 
b13 h5 h4 h3 h4 h5 h4 h5 
b14 h3 h3 h4 h3 h3 h3 h3 
where h2 = Low, h3 = Reasonably Low,                             
h4 = Moderate, and h5 = Reasonably High (refer to 
Table 2). 
Those justification results in Table 3 are                  
just of illustrative character of experts to                       
obtain the closest matching probabilities                     
of basic events to the known values.                                     
In real implementation, these justification results 
should be directly obtained from the selected               
experts in (12). 
 To mathematically illustrate how the                     
fuzzy reliability approach generates the probabilities 
of basic events of the AP1000 passive safety                  
system involved to mitigate the large break                   
LOCA, we choose only two basic events                       
from Table 1, i.e. b1 and b12. Basic event b1                      
is chosen to show that the approach can generate a 
probability as low as b1’s probability.                    
Meanwhile, basic event b12 is chosen to show that 
the approach can generate a probability as high as 
b12’s probability. 
 
Step 1: Basic event likely occurence evaluation 
 Using the experts’ evaluation results in              
Table 3, the matrix of the failure possibilities                    
(Ql) to qualitatively express the likely occurrences               
of basic events b1 and b12 can be written                          
as in (14). 
 
 
   [
              
              
]         (14) 
 
From Table 2, we can see that h3 = Reasonably Low, 
h4 = Moderate, and h5 = Reasonably High. 
 
Step 2: Failure possibility fuzzification 
 The matrix of the membership functions (Qn) 
is generated by fuzzifying the matrix Ql in (14) 
using membership functions presented in Table 2 as 
denoted in (15). 
 
   [
  ( )   ( )   ( )   ( )   ( )   ( )   ( )
  ( )   ( )   ( )   ( )   ( )   ( )   ( )
]  (15) 
 
From Table 2, we can see that 
  ( )                 ( )  (              ), 
  ( )           ( )  (              ) and 
  ( )                 ( )  (              ). 
Step 3: Final membership function generation 
Using (6), the set of final membership 
functions (M
B
) for the membership function matrix 
(Qn) in (15) is generated as follows. 
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Step 4: Membership function defuzzification 
Using (7) and (8), the set of failure 
possibility scores (  
 ) of the set of final 
membership functions (M
B
) in (16) is then 
generated as follows. 
 
  
  [
  
  
  
   
]  [
   (              )
   (              )
]  [
        
        
]  (17) 
 
Step 5: Basic event probability generation 
 Using (9) and (10), the set of probabilities 
(  ) of the set of failure possibility scores (  
 ) in 
(17) is generated as follows. 
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]  
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   4 -  
     - 4
]    (18) 
 
 We can see from (18) that the probabilities of 
basic events b1 and b2 are 7.54E-06 and                  
1.87E-04, respectively. The same procedures shown 
in (14-18) are also applied to generate the 
probabilities of other 12 basic events in                  
Table 1 and the results are summarized in                    
Table 4. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The probabilities of basic events of                      
the AP1000 passive safety system involved                    
to mitigate the large break LOCA listed in                  
Table 1 which are generated by the proposed fuzzy 
reliability approach are given in Table 4 together 
with their relative errors.  
From Table 4, we can see that the proposed 
fuzzy reliability approach can generate probabilities 
of basic events of  the AP1000 passive safety system 
involved to mitigate the large break LOCA without 
the need to engage to the probability  distributions of 
their life time to failure. In addition, the generated 
probabilities are also very close to the basic event 
probabilities used in Guimaraes et al. [16], which 
can be seen from the small number of relative errors 
between the two probabilities of the corresponding 
basic events. It will be interesting to see, in the 
future research, how the fuzzy reliability approach 
will perform for other components of the AP1000 
passive safety system. 
 
Table 4. Basic event probabilities. 
Basic event 
IDs 
Probabilities Relative 
error Generated Known 
b1 7.54E-06 7.59E-06 0.006761 
b2 1.12E-05 1.11E-05 0.006788 
b3 1.12E-05 1.11E-05 0.006788 
b4 7.54E-06 7.59E-06 0.006761 
b5 1.12E-05 1.11E-05 0.006788 
b6 1.12E-05 1.11E-05 0.006788 
b7 1.87E-04 1.90E-04 0.017906 
b8 1.87E-04 1.90E-04 0.017906 
b9 1.14E-04 1.06E-04 0.079635 
b10 1.87E-04 1.90E-04 0.017906 
b11 1.12E-05 1.11E-05 0.006788 
b12 1.87E-04 1.90E-04 0.017906 
b13 1.21E-04 1.21E-04 0.004125 
b14 7.54E-06 7.59E-06 0.006761 
 
Generally, these results have demonstrated 
that the proposed fuzzy reliability approach can be 
feasibly used for reliability study of components of 
the AP1000 passive safety system whose historical 
failure data are currently unavailable. It enables 
experts to subjectively and individually justify 
component reliability characteristics based on their 
expertise, working experience and scientific 
54 
J.H. Purba, D.T. Sony Tjahyani / Atom Indonesia Vol. 40 No. 2 (2014) 49 - 56 
 
 
intuition. Hence, it offers a more realistic  approach 
to assess the reliability of components of AP1000 
plants which are still under construction. However, 
if the expertise disparities of the selected experts on 
the AP1000 passive safety system are very 
substantial, the weights amongst experts will be 
different and, consequently, the likely occurrences of                    
basic events justified by them will also be very 
different. This condition will cause the proposed 
fuzzy reliability approach generating higher                            
relative errors. Hence, it is important to note                      
that the selection of the experts will affect the 
generation of the basic event probabilities to                 
some extents. 
We also need to note that as soon as 
components of the AP1000 passive safety system 
have probability distributions of their lifetime to 
failures, conventional probabilistic reliability 
approach should be used. This conventional 
approach will generate more relevant reliability 
characteristics of those components. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
A fuzzy reliability approach has been 
successfully implemented in this study to evaluate 
the reliability of the AP1000 passive safety system. 
The results of a case-based experiment show                      
that the basic event probabilities, which are 
generated by the approach, are very close                          
to the ones, which have been used by other 
researchers in the previous AP1000 reliability 
studies. This information can be inferred from                    
the small numbers of relative errors obtained                          
in the experiment, i.e. between 0.004125 and 
0.079633. These results confirm that the                        
fuzzy reliability approach offers a more                        
realistic approach to assess the reliabilities                         
of components of the AP1000 passive safety                             
system whose probability distribution of                                
their life time to failure are currently unavailable.                   
It also enables experts to subjectively and 
individually justify the likely occurrences                      
of basic events of the AP1000 passive safety system 
fault trees using qualitative failure possibilities 
which otherwise cannot be represented by 
quantitative data. For this purpose, they can utilize 
their expertise, working experience and scientific 
intuition. 
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